In the spring of 2014, when Russian and pro-Russian militants occupied part of the Donbas region and took control over Mariupol, it seemed that the city was destined to repeat the fate of neighboring Donetsk: looting, mass evacuation of civilians, a return to the Soviet lifestyle, and general downturn. However, Ukrainian forces managed to retake Mariupol in a month. The Azov servicemen played the main part in the military operation.
Over the next eight years, Mariupol continued to develop and flourish. Occupied Donetsk's most skilled and active residents, professionals, and entrepreneurs lifted their roots and moved to Mariupol. They were creating a showcase of the Ukrainian Donbas – both a developed industrial force and a welcoming, comfortable city.
The newly formed Azov military unit was developing just as quickly. In the fall of 2014, the volunteer battalion was reorganized into a regiment and incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine. In the winter of 2015, the Shyrokyne offensive operation was initiated by the Azov servicemen, resulting in the liberation of five villages east of Mariupol, accordingly preventing the Russians from being further able to shell the city. Later, marines joined the Azov Regiment as Mariupol defense forces, and the construction of a system of fortifications around the city was launched.
The efforts of the Ukrainian military allowed the city to enjoy peace, attract investments, and develop despite its proximity to the front line. In 2021, Mariupol ranked among the top ten most livable cities in Ukraine. Only the occasional movements of armored vehicles and the annual military parades dedicated to the city's liberation in 2014 reminded Mariupol residents of the war.
The total length of the outer defensive perimeter around Mariupol was 85 kilometers. It required at least 8,000 defenders, the entire garrison force. That said, there would be no fighters left in the rear – the city's depth of defense was up to 10 kilometers. Obviously, it would be impossible to hold Mariupol’s defenses with the forces available.
In the east, Mariupol was defended by a continuous deeply echeloned line of fortifications. In the west, there were separate strongpoints (mostly platoon-sized), located at dispersions of 500 meters to 6 kilometers from one another.
photo by Alex Shevchenko
The Ukrainian strongpoint near the village of Rybatske was one of dozens built west of Mariupol in 2015-2016.
Mariupol's defense planners considered the possibility of the city being enveloped from the west should there be a breakthrough near Volnovakha. For example, in the vicinity of the village of Peremoha, where the enemy had limited maneuver due to the terrain, three strongpoints were built at a road fork. Later, the Russian columns encircling Mariupol from the west would pass them unopposed.
Fortifications were built in 2015 at the western defensive sector, from the shoreline to the highway to Donetsk. Satellite imagery showed that most of them were untenable for defense by the summer of 2020. Come February 2022, almost nothing remained of many trenches. For example, the National Guard and Territorial Defense forces, who in the last days of February were at a checkpoint near the Metro supermarket, had to dig trenches in sub-zero temperatures while the city was already under sustained shelling.
On the eve of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the defenders of Mariupol sought to fortify along a reduced perimeter to hold on with the forces available. They were denied permission to carry out related work on privately owned agricultural land. After the city was captured, fortifications in those fields were nevertheless built, albeit by the invaders.
A few days before February 24, 2022, the command of the units stationed in Mariupol had no doubts about the imminence of the invasion. The 36th Marine Brigade, located at the first line of defense from Pyshchevyk to the coast of the Sea of Azov, was deployed and fought east of the city. The strikes on the marines had intensified the day before, but the brigade held its positions.
At the end of December 2021, Denys Prokopenko, commander of the Azov Regiment, spoke on the NTA TV channel about possible scenarios for the new phase of Russian aggression against Ukraine:
“Every Ukrainian must acknowledge that history is cyclical. Unfortunately, Russia will never give up its strategic plans to destroy a sovereign and independent Ukraine. From a military standpoint, we can outline at least three courses of action.
The most dangerous one is a full-scale offensive. I should emphasize that they will most likely advance along the shortest axis, from Bryansk to Kyiv. Via Chernihiv Oblast,the border is less than 200 km to Kyiv. It is the shortest way to capture our capital and compel the government to capitulate. This would clearly mean the involvement of all the offensive grouping located along our borders. It will also involve air and missile strikes. As military personnel, we have no right to dismiss this option, as we are dealing with a mentally unstable person who may take such risks…
I would also like to emphasize that our defense posture in the northern sector is not good enough. There are certain issues with the deployments of our units and engineering works, so the Russian forces may take advantage of these weaknesses. Of course, there will be a battle that will go down in history as a meat grinder. Still, we cannot dismiss this option.
Another more likely option is an offensive operation in Pryazovia to take control of the land corridor between the Crimean peninsula and the so-called “Donetsk People's Republic,” hereinafter referred to as the DPR. This operation will be carried out by amphibious and airborne forces. We are well aware of this section of the front line. It just so happened that historically the Azov Regiment was deployed in Pryazovia. At the training ground and the adjacent territory, we have been constantly practicing repelling seaborne and airborne assaults.
We should also not rule out a possible scenario that would pose no personal risk for Putin, compared to the first two ones. This means limited offensive operations in the Joint Forces Operation zone. This will have no global impact on the war between Russia and Ukraine, however, it will enable the enemy to showcase its strength and resolve to take such steps.” [1]
Bohdan Krotevych, chief of staff of the Azov Regiment, outlines the expectations of the Azov officers:
“We shared intelligence reports: from the commander, the chief of intelligence, the chief of operations, and also from me. I believed that Russia would not dare a full-scale offensive. According to the headquarters, this was a show of force before negotiations on Nord Stream 2, and the enemy only had enough forces to make a land corridor to Crimea. The chief of operations agreed with me but added that the enemy would try to capture Kherson to restore Crimea’s water supply. The chief of intelligence agreed with us but emphasized that the enemy forces were scattered and not gathered in a specific direction. Denys “Redis” Prokopenko was the only one who believed that the enemy would try to capture Kyiv despite its lack of force. We all thought it was illogical and unfeasible. As it later turned out, we were all partly correct.”[2]
There were operational protocols developed for the case of a full-scale invasion, according to which all Azov units were to move from their bases to Mariupol. On February 20, the regiment's tanks were taken to the forest near the village of Manhush. On February 23, the unit's reservists were to be mustered at the permanent station of the 12th Operational Brigade in Mariupol.
Mykhailo Vershynin, the head of the Donetsk Oblast Patrol Police, initiated intensive training of personnel in January: those interested could undergo training for machine guns and grenade launchers, the crews underwent exercises in vehicle reconnaissance and rapid extraction to designated safe zones. There were reinforced-concrete fortifications installed around the building of the Patrol Police Department. In mid-February, there were drills for rapid personnel emergency deployment.
Mykhailo “Kot (Cat)” Vershynin, chief of the Donetsk Oblast Patrol Police:
“When we started building fortifications near our permanent station, everyone thought I was crazy. I had one answer to every question: I had received an order from the command.” [3]